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1. The Game Models.
The gpme theoretic models we develop are based on the folowing scenario. One side
called Infiltrator needs to get supplies to one of its installations which is accessible only via
achannel under the control of another side called Defender. Defender has placed anumber
of static underwater devices which can be placed in the channel and which will detect any
vessel going near them. Furthermore Defender will be able to destroy any vessel it detects
before the vessel can deliver its supplies to the installation. Rom now on we will use the
terms cable and agent for static underwater device and vessel respectively.
The scenario can be modelled as atwo person zer0-sum game of ambush as folows.
Common sense tells us that it would be natural for Oeknder to place the cables at the
narrowest part of the channel so, by choosing units appropriately, the game can be thought
of as taking place in the unit interval $[0,1]$ . Assuming that Defender has $m$ cables with
detection radii of $a_{1}/2,a_{2}/2$ , $\ldots$ , $a_{m}/2$ , they can then be represented as Hue segments of lengths
$a_{1}$ ,a2, $\ldots$ , $a_{m}$ which are placed in $[0,1]$ ; we will assume that $a_{1}\geq\cdots\geq a_{m}$ . The position of
the cable can be uniquely defined by $\dot{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{v}\dot{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{g}$ the coordinate ef the left-hand endpoint of
the interval it covers. Thus we can think of aDefender strategy as achoice of $m$ points
in $[0, 1]$ where the $i$-th point $x$:represents the $i$-th cable being laid in the closed interval
$[x:,x:+a.\cdot]$ . Rom astrictly practical point of view, it would be necessary to impose the
condition $x:+a_{j}\leq 1$ , but, to analyse the gpme, it is convenient to ignore this restriction and
merely stipulate that the $x\dot{.}$ lie in $[0, 1]$ . In the implementation of astrategy, one would then
interpret an interval $[xi,x:+a.\cdot]$ with $x:+a:>1$ as the interval $[1-a:, 1]$;this new interval clearly
detects all the agents detected by the one it replaces. Agents attempting to pass through the
channel will be detected or not depending on the position they have at the narrowest part
of the channel. Thus, if Infiltrator has $r$ agents at his disposal, we can think of Infiltrator as
choosing $r$ points, one for each agent, in $[0,1]$ . Choosing an appropriate payoff function is not
so clearcut but, if we take the stance that the Infiltrator installation desperately needs some
supplies and that asingle agent reaching it would provide relief for asatisfactory period, a
natural payoff for the Defender is 1if all the agents are detected and 0otherwise. Such a
payoff would represent the situation where the installation can be relieved via other means
but these means will take some time to activate and the channel is the only way to provide
supplies in the meantime.
More formally we let $\Gamma$( $a_{1}$ ,a2 $\ldots$ , $a_{m};r$) denote the two person zer0-sum aeme in $[0,1]$ in
which the Defender strategy space is $[0, 1]^{m}$ , the Infiltrator strategy space is $[0, 1]^{r}$ and the
payoff to Defender when the players use $x\in[0,1]^{m}$ and $y\in[0,1]^{r}$ is 1if $y_{j}\in \mathrm{U}_{=1}^{m}\dot{.}[x:,x:+a.\cdot]$ for
$j=1$ , $\ldots$ , $r$ and 0otherwise. The value of $\Gamma(a_{1}, \ldots,a_{m};r)$ is denoted by $v(a_{1}, \ldots,a_{m}jr)$ .
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This game with $r=1$ was introduced, and the case $m=1$ solved, by Ruckle et al. The
special case $\Gamma$ ( $a_{1}$ , a2; 1) has proved more challenging artd acomplete solution of it has not
been found. Baston and Bostock and Lee have solved the cases $a_{1}\geq 1/2$ and $1/3\leq a_{1}<1/2$
respectively while Zoroa et al have obtained anumber of results when various relations hold
between $a_{1}$ and $a_{2}$ . Very recently Woodward, aresearch student of the first author, has
proved that $\Gamma(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m};r)$ can be solved by considering an “equivalent” (finite) matrix game.
This means that linear programming can be employed on individual cases and, using linear
programming results, Woodward has obtained solutions of $\Gamma$ ( $a_{1}$ ,am) $a_{3};1)$ for the case when
$a_{1}\geq 1/3$ and $a_{3}\geq 1/5$ . Woodward has also shown that his matrix game is closely related
to the finite game introduced by Garnaev. Garnaev’s game is similar to $\Gamma(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m};1)$ but
play takes place on an integer interval and integer intervals replace the intervals of length
$a_{1}$ , $\ldots$ , $a_{m}$ ;details of the results on this game can be found in Garnaev.
The second model we develop differs ffom $\Gamma(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m};r)$ in just one respect, namely
the information that is available to Defender. In this new model, which we denote by
$\Gamma_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})$ , Defender does not know how many agents Infiltrator has at his disposal. This
change radically alters the situation and $\Gamma_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})$ is not agame in the same sense as
$\Gamma(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m};r)$ is. However there are natural definitions of optimal strategy and value for
$\Gamma_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})$ .
Definition 1.1. ADefender strategy $D$ in $\Gamma_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})$ is optimal if $D$ is an optimal strategy
in $\Gamma(a_{1}, \ldots,a_{m};r)$ for all positive integers $r$ .
In Section 4we prove that Defender has an optimal strategy in $\Gamma_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})$ when the
$a_{1}$ , $\ldots$ , $a_{m}$ satisfy certain conditions and also produce evidence that it is unlikely that he
always has one. If Defender does not have an optimal strategy in $\Gamma_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})$ , the strategy
he thinks ‘host effective” will depend on his estimate of the probabilities $p_{r}(r=1,2, \ldots)$
of Infiltrator having $r$ agents. Suppose, for example, Defender believes that Infiltrator has
only one or two agents but that each is equally likely, then Defender may choose astrategy
which is neither optimal against one agent nor against two but is ‘keasonably effective”
against both. If Infiltrator has, in fact, two agents, it is not obvious that he should play
astrategy which is optimal in $\Gamma(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m};2)$ because Defender is not playing optimally in
that game. Clearly any solution concept that copes with this situation has to have amore
complicated structure than the standard zer0-sum one. In fact the appropriate context for
these problems is that of Bayesian games but, in this paper, we restrict attention to asimpler
solution concept which, although less widely applicable than the Bayesian one, still yields
solutions in avariety of cases.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, we introduce the following definitions.
Definition 1.2. An Infiltrator strategy $S$ in $\Gamma_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})$ is optimal if Defender has an
optimal strategy in $\Gamma_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})$ and $S$ is optimal in $\Gamma(a_{1}, \ldots,a_{m};r)$ .
Definition 1.3. If both Defender and Infiltrator have optimal strategies in $\Gamma_{r}$ ( $a_{1}$ , $\ldots$ ,am), we
say that $\Gamma_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})$ has avalue $v_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})$ given by $\Gamma_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})=\Gamma(a_{1}, \ldots,a_{m};r)$ .
It should be noted that, even when $\Gamma_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})$ has avalue, it is qualitatively different
from $\Gamma(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m};r)$ because, although Defender knows how to play optimally in $\Gamma_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})$ ,
he does not know its value, only that it lies in the set $\{v(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m};r):r=1, 2, \ldots\}$ .
Having addressed the situation in which Defender has incomplete information, it is natu-
ral to also consider the scenario in which Infiltrator has incomplete information. The positio$\mathrm{n}$
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in this case is more complex and it appears difficult to obtain meaningful results if Infiltrator
has no information concerning the number of cables Defender has or their lengths. How-
ever we see in Section 2that Infiltrator can act optimally without knowing the number of
cables provided he knows their lengths lie in particular ranges. Section 4also contains a
result which involves Infiltrator having only partial information concerning the cable lengths
although he does need to know the number of cables.
2. Infiltrator Does Not Know the Number of Cables.
For all our models the easiest case to consider is the one in which all the cable lengths
are equal and, if there is an emphasis on standardized production, it is also the most natural.
Even so, this special case illustrates some of the difficulties which can arise and which make
the general case chalenging. We first consider the particular example with $a_{1}=a_{2}=1/4$ .
It is easy to see that an optimal strategy for Defender in $\Gamma(1/4,1/4;1)$ is to choose (0, 1/4)
and (1/2, 3/4) at random but, in $\Gamma(1/4,1/4;2)$ , this is avery bad Defender strategy because
Infiltrator can always get an agent through undetected by using the strategy $(0, 1)$; we will
show later that $v(1/4,1/4;2)=1/6=v_{2}(1/4,1/4)$ so there is an optimal Defender strategy in
$\Gamma(1/4,1/4;1)$ which is also optimal in $\Gamma(1/4,1/4;2)$ . This ilustrates that, to prove that Defender
does not have an optimal strategy in $\Gamma_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})$ , we effectively have to check that, for ever$ry$
optimal strategy $D$ in $\Gamma(a_{1}, \ldots,a_{m};1)$ , there is a $t$ such that $D$ is non-0ptimal in $\Gamma(a_{1},\ldots,a_{m};t)$ .
As is often the case, proving non-existence is likely to be difficult, apart (perhaps) ffom some
very particular examples.
Our first result does not require that all the cable lengths are equal, oily that they all
lie in aparticular range.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose, for some positive integer $n$ , $1/n\leq a:<1/(\mathrm{n}-1)$ for $i=1$ , $\ldots$ , $n\iota$ then
$v(a_{1}, \ldots,a_{m};r)=(\begin{array}{l}n-rm-r\end{array})/(\begin{array}{l}nm\end{array})$ .
An optimal strategy $D$ chooses $m$ out of the $I_{t}=[(t-1)/n,t/n]$ , ($t=1$ , $\ldots,n$ at random and
covers these $m$ intervals with his cable lengths. An $\mathrm{q}$) $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{d}$ Infiltrator strategy Ichooses $r$ of
the points $P_{t}=1/(\mathrm{n}-1)$ , $(t=1, \ldots,n)$ at random and sends his infiltrators down the channel
at these points.
Proof. Let the Defender use the strategy $D$ and $(y_{1}\ldots.,y_{r})$ be astrategy for the Infiltrator.
If the $y_{i}$ $(i=1, \ldots, r)$ are in $r$ distinct intervals $I_{1}\ldots.$ , $I_{n}$ , then the number of Defender (pure)
$i\neq j\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}I_{k}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}r\mathrm{t}\mathrm{f}$
’
the infitrators. Hence $v(a_{1}, \ldots,a_{m};r)\geq(\begin{array}{l}n-rm-r\end{array})/(\begin{array}{l}nm\end{array})$ .
Let Infiltrator use the strategy $Dj$ note that acable length can cover at most one point
of the $P_{i}$ $(i=1, \ldots,n)$ . Given apure strategy for the Defender, it therefore follows that it
can detect all of the infiltrators in at most $(\begin{array}{l}mr\end{array})$ of the Infiltrator (pure) strategies. Hence
$v(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m};r)\leq(\begin{array}{l}mr\end{array})/(\begin{array}{l}nf\end{array})$ . The result foUows because $(\begin{array}{l}mr\end{array})/(\begin{array}{l}nr\end{array})=(\begin{array}{l}n-rm-r\end{array})/(\begin{array}{l}nm\end{array})$ . $\bullet$
Notice that the Defender strategy D does not involve r so that the Defender does not
need to know the value of r to play optimally. We therefore have the following corollary
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Corollary 2.2. Suppose, for some integer $n$ , $1/n\leq a_{i}<1/(\mathrm{n}-1)$ for $i=1$ , $\ldots$ , $m$, then
$v_{r}(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{m})=(\begin{array}{l}n-rm-r\end{array})/(\begin{array}{l}nm\end{array})$ .
Note also that the Infiltrator strategy Ionly uses $n$ and not the particular values of the
$a_{i}$ . Thus Infiltrator can play optimally without knowing the precise values of the $a_{i}$ provided
he knows that the values all lie in an interval $[1/n, 1/(\mathrm{n}-1)]$ and the value of $n$ .
The theorem tells the Defender that, if all the cable lengths are within an interval of the
form $[1/n, 1/(n-1)]$ for some integer $n$ , and the Infiltrator has this information, then he gets
no benefits from having different different lengths of cable nor ffom having any cable lengths
other than the smallest one $1/n$ . This would be useful knowledge if, instead of having cables
to hand, the Defender was having to decide on what cable lengths should be manufactured
to defend achannel.
3. Game with Two Cables.
In this section we obtain upper and lower bounds on $v$ ( $a_{1}$ ,a2; 2) and show that, for some
pairs ($a_{1}$ ,a2), the bounds are equal. For asubset of these pairs, we go on to prove that
$v_{r}$ ( $a_{1}$ , a2) exists and determine its value.
Theorem 3.1. Let $\mu_{1}=\lceil(1-a_{1})/a_{2}\rceil$ , $\mu_{2}=\lceil(1-2\mathrm{a}\mathrm{i})/\mathrm{a}21$ and $\rho=\lfloor a_{1}/a_{2}\rfloor$ . If $\rho\geq\mu_{2}$ , then
$v(a_{1},a_{2;}r)\geq 1/(\mu_{1}+\mu_{2})$ .
Theorem 3.2. Let $\mu_{\iota}=\lceil(1-ia_{1})/a_{2}\rceil$ for positive integers $i$ and $P= \max\{i:\mu_{i}>0\}$ , then
$v(q_{1},a_{2;}2)\geq 1/(\mu_{1}+\cdots+\mu_{P})$ .
Proof. We introduce pure Defender strategies which will be used in amixed strategy which
will be shown to be guarantee the Defender an expectation of at least $1/(\mu_{1}+\cdots+\mu_{P})$ . For $t=$
$1$ , $\ldots$ , $P$ and $\mathrm{J}\{\mathrm{t}$) $=0$ , $\ldots$ , $\mu_{t}-1$ , put $I_{i(t)}^{(t)}=((t-1)a_{1},ta_{1}\dagger i(t)a_{2})$ and $J_{i(t)}^{(t)}=(1-ta_{1},1-ta_{1}-(i(t)\dagger 1)a_{2})$ .
Let $\mathrm{I}^{(t)}=\bigcup_{i(t)=0}^{\mu \mathrm{r}-1}\{I_{i(t)}^{(t)}\}$ , $J^{(t)}= \bigcup_{i(t)=0}^{\mu_{t}-1}\{J_{i(t)}^{(t)}\}$ and $\mathrm{S}=\mathrm{U}_{t=1}^{P}\mathrm{I}^{(t)}\cup J^{(t)}$ . Consider the mixed Defender
strategy which chooses amember of $S$ at random. Since $S$ contains 2 $\Sigma_{i=1}^{P}\mu_{i}$ pure strategies,
the result follows if, for any pure Infiltrator strategy $(y_{1}, y_{2})$ , both infiltrators are detected by
at least two members of $S$ . We may clearly assume that $y_{1}\leq y_{2}$ .
If $y_{1}\in[(\beta-1)a_{1},\beta a_{1}]$ for some $\beta$ satisfying $1\leq\beta\leq P$, it is easy to check that both infiltrators
are detected by at least one member of $\mathrm{I}^{(\beta)}$ and by every member of $\mathrm{I}^{(\beta)}$ if $y_{2}\leq\beta a_{1}$ . Now
$\mu_{1}>1$ because $a_{1}+a_{2}<1$ so $|1^{(1)}|\geq 2$ and we can suppose $y_{2}>a_{1}\geq 1$ -Pax by the definition of
$P$. Thus $y_{2}\in[1-ta_{1},1-(t-1)\mathrm{a}\mathrm{i}]$ for some $t$ satisfying $1\leq t\leq P$ and it then follows that both
infiltrators are also detected by amember of $J^{(t)}$ .
Hence the only case remaining to consider is that when $y_{1}>Pa_{1}\geq 1-a_{1}$ . But then both
infiltrators are detected by the members of $J^{(1)}$ and the result follows. $\bullet$
Theorem 3.3. Let $\lambda=\mathrm{T}_{2}\frac{a}{\overline{a}}11$ and $k^{*}=\mathfrak{f}^{\frac{1-a}{\lambda a_{2}}[perp]}1$ . For $k=1$ , $\ldots$ , $k^{*}$ , let $\alpha_{k}=\lceil\frac{1-a_{1}-(k-1)\lambda a_{2}}{a_{2}}\rceil$ . Then
$v(a_{1}, a_{2;}2) \leq 1/\sum_{k=1}^{k}.\alpha_{k}$ .
Proof. Let $1-a_{1}-(k-1)\mathrm{a}2=(\alpha_{k}-1)\mathrm{a}2+\eta_{k}$ , then $\eta_{k}>0$ by the definition of $\alpha_{k}$ . Take
$\eta=77\dot{\mathrm{u}}n\{\eta_{k} : k=1, \ldots, k^{*}\}$ and choose $\epsilon>0$ and $\delta>0$ such that $\alpha_{1}\epsilon<\delta$ and $k^{*}\delta+\alpha_{1}\epsilon<\eta$. For
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$k=1$ , $\ldots$ , $k^{*}$ and $j=1$ , $\ldots$ , $\alpha_{k}$ , let $x_{j}=(j-1)a_{2}+j\epsilon$ , $y_{kj}=x_{j}+a_{1}+(k-1)k_{2}+k\delta_{k}$ and $P_{kj}=(x_{\mathit{3}},y_{kj})$ .
Not $\mathrm{e}$ that $y_{kg}=1-(1-a_{1}-(k-1)\lambda \mathrm{z}_{2})+(j-1)a_{2}+k\delta+j\epsilon\leq 1-(\alpha_{k}-j)a_{2}-\eta_{k}+k^{*}\delta+\alpha_{1}\epsilon<1$ and
$x_{J}<y_{kj}$ so $P_{kj}$ is avalid pure strategy for Infiltrator. We will show that, for any placement
of the cables, at most one of the $P_{kj}$ has both of its agents detected.
Assume that there is apure Defender strategy which detects both agents in $P_{kj}$ and both
in $P_{k’j’}$ where $(k,j)\neq(k’,j’)$; without loss of generality we may assume $j\leq j’$ . First note that
$y_{kj}-x_{j}>b$ so one cable length cannot detect both agents of $P_{kj}$ nor both agents of $P_{k’j’}$ .
Thus each cable length must detect an agent of $P_{kj}$ and an agent of $P_{k’j’}$ . If $j=j’$ , then $k\neq k’$
and acable length must therefore detect both $y_{kj}$ and $y_{k’j’}$ but this is impossible because
$|y_{kj}-y_{k’j’}|>k_{2}\geq a_{1}$ by the definition of $\lambda$ Hence we may assume $j’>j$ . Since $x_{j’}>x_{j}$ $- \mathrm{B}_{2}$ and
$ykj>x_{j’}$ , the cable of length a2 cannot detect agent $x_{j}$ . Thus the cable of length $a_{1}$ detects
agent $x_{j}$ and, because $y_{k’j’}>a_{1}+x_{j’}\geq a_{1}+x_{j}$ , it must then also detect agent $x_{j’}$ . Thus, using
$a_{1}\leq\lambda_{l_{2}}$ , $(j’-1)a_{2}+j’\epsilon=x_{j’}\leq x_{j}+k_{2}=(j-1+\lambda)a_{2}$ \dagger $j\epsilon$ and so $j’\leq j-1+\lambda$ because $\epsilon>0$ .
Hence $x_{j’}-x_{j}\leq(\lambda-1)\mathrm{a}2+(j’-j)\epsilon$ . Clearly $|y_{kj}-y_{k’j’}|>a_{2}$ if $k’\geq k$ so we can assume $k>k’$ but
then $|y_{kj}-y_{k’j’}|>(k-k’)(k_{2}+\delta)-(x_{j’}-x_{j})\geq k_{2}+\delta-\{(\lambda-1)a_{2}+(j’-j)\epsilon\}\geq a_{2}+\delta-(\alpha_{1}-1)\epsilon>a_{2}$ .
Hence, for any pure Defender strategy, at most one of the $P_{kj}$ has both its agents detected.
The $P_{kj}$ are clearly distinct so, if the Infiltrator chooses each point $P_{kj}$ with equal probability,
the searcher will discover both agents with probability of at most $1/ \sum_{k=1}^{k}.\alpha_{k}$ . $\bullet$
Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 give alower bound and an upper bound for the value of the gpme and
anatural question is whether they are best possible. The answer is yes in the sense that the
bounds coincide in some cases as the folowing theorem demonstrates.
Theorem 3.4. For apositive integer m, suppose $a_{1}=a_{2}m$ . Then
$v(a_{1},a_{2;}2)= \frac{1}{\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{2}+\cdots+\alpha_{k}}$. $= \frac{1}{\mu_{1}+\mu_{2}+\cdots+\mu_{P}}$ ,
where $\mu_{i},P,\alpha_{k}$ and $k^{*}$ are defined in the previous theorems.
By ausual consideration in the two person zer0-sum games, we see that $v(a, b;2)$ is increasing
in both $a_{1}$ and $a_{2}$ . Rom this and ffom Theorem 3.4, we obtain the next corollary.
Corollary 3.5. For apositive integer $m$ , suppose $a_{2}(m-1)<a_{1}<a_{2}m$ . Then
$\frac{1}{\mathrm{L}\frac{1}{a_{2}(m-1)}\rfloor\{\lceil\frac{1}{a_{2}}\rceil-\frac{(m-1)(\mathrm{L}_{-}^{\frac{1}{a(m1)}}\mathrm{J}+1)}{2}\}}\leq v(a_{1},a_{2;}2)\leq\frac{1}{\mathrm{L}\frac{1}{a_{2}m}\rfloor\{\lceil\frac{1}{a_{2}}\rceil-\frac{m(\lfloor_{am}\rfloor+1)}{2}\}}"$.
Suppose $a_{1}=1/n$ and $a_{2}=\mathrm{a}\mathrm{i}/\mathrm{k}$ for some positive integers $n$ and $k$ . It folows ffom
Theorem 3.4 that the mixed Defender strategy $D^{*}$ in the proof of Theorem 41 is optimal
in $\mathrm{r}(1/\mathrm{n}, 1/(kn);2)$ ;furthermore $\mu:=k(n-i)$ so $v(1/n, 1/(kn);2)=2/\{\mathrm{k}\mathrm{n}(\mathrm{n}-1))$ . If $n\geq 3$ and
Infiltrator has at least three agents, Infiltrator can always get an agent through undetected
by sending agents through at the points 0,1/2 and 1. Thus, for $n\geq 3$ , $\mathrm{v}(1/\mathrm{n}, 1/(kn);r)=0$ for
$r\geq 3$ and any Defender strategy is optimal in $\mathrm{r}(1/\mathrm{n}, 1/(kn);r)$ for $r\geq 3$ . Using Remark 1, we
therefore have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.6. For positive integers $n\geq 3$ and $k$ , $v_{1}(1/n, 1/(kn))=(k\dagger 1)/(kn)$ , $v_{2}(1/n, 1/(kn))=$
$2/\{\mathrm{k}\mathrm{n}(\mathrm{n}-1))$ and $\mathrm{v}\mathrm{r}(1/\mathrm{n}, 1/(kn))=0$ for $r\geq 3$ .
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The case when $a_{1}=ka_{2}$ for some positive integer $k$ and $a_{1}\neq 1/n$ for any positive integer
$n$ cannot be dealt with so easily. To illustrate this, $D^{*}$ is not optimal in $\Gamma(2/7,1/7;1)$ because,
against $D^{*}$ , Infiltrator can restrict Defender’s payoff to 7/18 by sending an agent through
the point 5/18 whereas it is known that $v(2/7,1/7;1)=3/7>7/18$ . We suspect that, for this
case, Defender does not have an optimal strategy against an unknown number of agents and
that an effective Defender strategy will need to take into account his beliefs (probabilities)
concerning the number of agents available to Infiltrator.
4. Guaranteed Infiltrator Penetration.
The question of how many agents Infiltrator needs to ensure that at least one of them
gets through undetected is an interesting and potentially important one for both players. To
obtain an answer it seems that the Infiltrator does have to have some knowledge of the cable
lengths. Trivially, if he knows that Defender has $m$ cable lengths all of which are less than
$1/m$, he can ensure that at least one gets through undetected by sending $m1$ $1$ infiltrators
down the channel at points $t/m$ $(t=0,1, \ldots,m)$ . If the Infiltrator has more precise information,
we can have aless trivial result.
Theorem 4.1. If the Infiltrator knows all the cable lengths (and they sum to less than one),
then Infiltrator can ensure at least one agent gets through undetected if he has at least $2^{m}$
agents.
Proof. Let $Z=\{\lambda_{1}a_{1}+\cdots+\lambda_{m}a_{m} : \lambda_{i}\in\{0,1\}i=1, \ldots,m\}$ and arrange the members of $Z$
as increasing sequence $z_{0}=0$ , $z_{1}$ , $\ldots$ , $z_{2^{m}-1}$ . Suppose the Infiltrator uses the strategy in which
infiltrators are sent down the channel at the points $w_{i}=z_{i}+i\mathit{6}$ $(i=0,1\ldots, 2^{m} - 1)$ where
$2^{m}\delta<1$ – $\Sigma_{i=1}^{m}a_{i}$ . Suppose aDefender strategy detects all of these infiltrators, then, in
particular, one length say $a_{t_{1}}$ must cover the point $w_{0}=0$ . Now $a_{t_{1}}=z_{s_{1}}$ for some $s_{1}$ and so $a_{t_{1}}$
cannot cover the point $w_{s_{1}}$ . Hence this point must be covered by alength $a_{s_{2}}$ which in turn
cannot cover the point $w_{s_{2}}$ where $s_{2}$ is given by $z_{s_{2}}=a_{t_{1}}+a_{t_{2}}$ . Continuing this process we see
that $w_{s_{m}}=w_{2^{m}-1}$ will not be covered by any length $a_{i}$ if all the other $w_{i}$ are covered. $\bullet$
If Infiltrator knows the individual lengths of the cables, he also knows the sum of their
lengths and, if this sum is significantly less than one, we shall see below that abetter upper
bound than that in the theorem can be obtained. However the theorem as it stands is sharp
and, for any positive integer $m$, its upper bound of $2^{m}$ cannot be improved as the following
example demonstrates.
Example. Let $a_{i}--2^{i-1}/2^{m}$ for $i=1$ , $\ldots$ , $m$, then Infiltrator cannot guarantee an agen $\mathrm{t}$ gets
$\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\Phi$ undetected if he has at most $2^{m-1}$ agents.
Proof. We prove the result by giving aDefender strategy which guarantees that, for any
pure Infiltrator strategy involving $2^{m-1}$ agents, there is aprobability of at least $1/2^{m}$ that all
agents are detected. Note that, given any integer $r$ satisfying $0\leq r\leq 2^{m}-1$ , there is aunique
subset of the $a_{i}$ which sum to $\mathrm{r}/2\mathrm{m}$ . Thus, for any such $r$, Defender can use the pure strategy
$S_{r}$ which places the cables so that they cover the intervals $[0, r/2^{m}]$ and $[(r+1)/2\mathrm{m})1]$ . There
are $2^{m}$ such strategies and we let $S$ denote the mixed Defender strategy which selects one of
them at random. Now consider apure Infiltrator strategy; if this strategy has no agent in
the interval $(r/2^{m}, (r+1)/2\mathrm{m})$ , every agent is detected by $S_{r}$ and there is aprobability of at
least $1/2^{m}$ that all the agents are detected by $S$ . Hence, to ensure that at least one agent gets
through undetected against $S$ , an Infiltrator strategy must place an agent in every one of
the intervals $(r/2^{m}, (r+1)/2\mathrm{m})r=0$ , 1, $\ldots$ , $2^{m}-1$ . Since these intervals are disjoint, this cannot
be achieved with $2^{m}-1$ agents.
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